經濟學人-Has ?nance been ?xed

經濟學人-Has ?nance been ?xed

來自專欄老白說英文

經濟學人-180908-Has ?nance been ?xed 財政系統的漏洞,補好了嗎?

The system is safer. But the right lessons have not all been learned

系統更安全了。但是我們並沒有吸取所有教訓。

WHEN historians gaze back at the early 21st century, they will identify two seismic shocks. The ?rst was the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, the second the global ?nancial crisis, which boiled over ten years ago this month with the collapse of Lehman Brothers. September11th led to wars, Lehman』s bankruptcy to an economic and political reckoning. Just as the ?ghting continues, so the reckoning is far from over.

當歷史學家回望21世紀初時,會發現兩件令人震驚的事。第一件是2001年9月11號的恐怖襲擊,第二件是全球經濟危機。後者導致雷曼兄弟在十年前的9月宣告破產。911事件引發了戰爭,雷曼兄弟破產引發了經濟和政治清算。恢復經濟的鬥爭還在繼續,鄭智清算也遠沒有結束。

  • seismic /sa?zm?k/ 地震的

Lehman failed after losing money on toxic loans and securities linked to America』s property market. Its bankruptcy unleashed chaos. Trade fell in every country on which the World Trade Organisation reports. Credit supplied to the real economy fell, by perhaps $2trn in America alone. To limit their indebtedness, governments resorted to austerity. Having exhausted the scope to cut interest rates, central bankers turned to quantitative easing(creating money to buy bonds).

雷曼兄弟栽跟頭,是在損失了跟美國房地產相關的壞賬和證券之後。它的破產一度導致混亂。WTO報道的每一個國家,其經濟都在下行。僅僅在美國,與實體經濟相關的信貸可能高達2000億美元。為了防止債務進一步擴大,政府不得不縮減開支。千方百計降息,中央銀行政策轉向量化寬鬆(目的在於印錢買債券)。

Just as the causes of the ?nancial crisis were many and varied, so were its consequences. It turbocharged today』s populist surge, raising questions about income inequality, job insecurity and globalisation. But it also changed the ?nancial system (see Brie?ng). The question is: did it change it enough?

正如導致經濟危機的原因多種多樣各不相同,其引發的後果也是一樣。它加速了今天平民運動的爆發,引發了收入不平等的質疑,工作不穩定性以及全球化。但與此同時,它也改變了財政系統。問題在於,這種改變是否足夠深刻?

To splurge is human

人是浪費之本

One way—the wrong way—to judge progress would be to expect an end to ?nancial crises. Systemic banking meltdowns are a feature of human history. The IMF has counted 124 of them between 1970 and 2007. There is no question that they will occur again, if only because good times breed complacency. Consider that the Trump administration is deregulating ?nance during an economic boom and that the Federal Reserve has not yet raised counter-cyclical capital requirements. Even when prudence prevails, no regulator is a perfect judge of risk.

有種觀點認為結束經濟危機判斷進步的方式,但這種方式是錯誤的。系統性銀行業熔斷,是人類歷史的特徵之一。據世界銀行統計,從1970年至2007年,一共

發生了124起熔斷。如果因為好時代讓人放鬆警惕,那麼毫無疑問,今後還會發生熔斷。考慮到特朗普當局在經濟繁榮期間違反法律,並且美聯儲也沒有提出反周期的資本需求。即使再小心謹慎,也沒有監管人員能全身而退。

  • meltdown /meltda?n/ 徹底垮台,熔斷
  • counter-cyclical 反周期的
  • prudence /pru?d(?)ns/ 審慎,方針

A better test is whether the likelihood and size of crises can be reduced. On that, the news is both good and bad.

倒不如預測下經濟危機發生的可能性和減小波及範圍。從這個角度看,這則新聞就喜憂參半了。

First, the good. Banks must now fund themselves with more equity and less debt. They depend less on trading to make money and on short-term wholesale borrowing to ?nance their activities. Even in Europe, where few banks make large pro?ts, the system as a whole is stronger than it was. Regulators have beefed up their oversight, especially of the largest institutions that are too big to fail. On both sides of the Atlantic banks are subject to regular stress tests and must submit plans for their own orderly demise. Derivatives markets of the type that felled AIG, an insurer, are smaller and safer. Revamped pay policies should prevent a repeat of the injustice of bankers taking public money while pocketing huge pay-packets—in 2009 sta? at the ?ve biggest banks trousered $114bn.

先說好事。銀行必須增加資金儲備,同時降低債務。銀行並不需要依靠貿易和短期大量借貸來為運營提供資金。即使在極少有銀行賺取高額利潤的歐洲,從整體上看銀行系統也比之前更加完善。監管者們已經提高了監管標準,尤其是那些體量巨大,受危機影響微乎其微的幾家大機構。大西洋兩岸的銀行都遵循著壓力的考驗,同時必須上交各自的破產計劃。導致保險公司AIG破產的衍生市場,規模變得更小也更加安全。補充性支付政策不應該給無恥銀行家反覆盜取資產,中飽私囊的機會--2009年,前五家世界最大銀行流失的金額達1140億。

  • trouser/?tra?z?/ 這裡不是「褲子」的單數,而是指通過不正當手段獲得大量財產

Yet many lessons have gone unlearned. Take, for example, policy makers』 mistakes in the aftermath of the crisis. The state had no choice but to stand behind failing banks, but it took the ill-judged decision to all but abandon insolvent households. Perhaps 9m Americans lost their homes in the recession; unemployment rose by over 8m. While households paid down

debt,consumer spending was ravaged.

但人們並沒有因此吸取教訓。拿經濟危機後決策者們制定的政策舉例,國家不能放棄瀕臨破產的銀行,但是採取各種其他政策的同時,並沒有放棄無力償還的房產。大約有900萬美國人在經濟衰退中賣掉了房產;失業人數超過了800萬。當房產債務還請後,消費者購買力已經元氣大傷。

  • ill-judged /ild??d?d/ 考慮不足的
  • insolvent/?nsɑlv?nt/ 無力償還的,破產的
  • recession /r?s???n/ 衰退
  • ravage /r?v?d?/ 損壞,破壞

It has taken fully ten years for the countervailing economic stimulus to restore America』s economy to health. Many of Europe』s economies still su?er from weak aggregate demand. Fiscal and monetary policy could have done more, sooner, to bring about recovery. They were held back by mostly misplaced concerns about government debt and in?ation. The fact that this failing is not more widely acknowledged augurs badly for the policy response next time.

美國用補償性手段來恢復經濟,花了整整十年。很多歐洲經濟體至今仍受經濟增長疲軟的影響。其實,如果不是受制於錯誤的對政府債務和通脹的擔憂,財政和貨幣政策在恢復經濟方面能做的更多,成效更快。實際上,經濟恢復的難度之大並沒有得到廣泛認同,而這也清晰地預示著下次經濟衰退時,糟糕的經濟政策。

  • countervailing /ka?nt?vel??/ 補償的
    • countervailing duties 抵銷性關稅;反補貼稅;反傾銷稅
  • stimulus /st?mj?l?s/ 刺激物
  • aggregate /?ɡr?ɡ?t/ 聚集的,總計達
  • in?ation /?nfle??n/ 通貨膨脹
  • augur /?g?/ 預示,語言

Stagnation has, inevitably, fed populism. And, by looking for scapegoats and simplistic solutions that punish them, populism has made it harder to confront the real long-term problems that the crisis exposed. Three stand out: housing, o?shore dollar ?nance and the euro.

經濟停滯必然導致平民主義。通過尋找替罪羊和簡單粗暴的方式--懲罰他們,平民主義使得解決經濟危機暴露出的長期問題,難上加難。有三個因素很突出:房產,離岸美元政策以及歐元。

  • stagnation /st?ɡ?ne??n/ 停滯
  • populism /?pɑpj??l?z?m/ 平民主義
  • scapegoat /skepɡot/ 替罪羊
  • simplistic /s?mpl?st?k/ 過分單純化的

To share divine 同甘共苦

The precise shape of the next ?nancial crisis is unclear—otherwise it would surely be avoided. But, in one way or another, it is likely to involve property. Rich-world governments have never properly reconciled a desire to boost home ownership with the need to avoid dangerous booms in household credit, as in the mid-2000s. In America the reluctance to confront this means that the taxpayer underwrites 70% of all new mortgage lending. Everywhere, regulations encourage banks to lend against property rather than make loans to businesses. The risk will be mitigated only when politicians embrace fundamental reforms, such as reducing household borrowing, with risk-sharing mortgages or permanent constraints on loan-to value ratios. In America taxpayers should get out of the rotten business of guaranteeing mortgage debt. Sadly, populists are hardly likely to take on homeowners.

下次經濟危機將以何種形式到來目前還無法得知--否則就可以完美躲開。但是,無論哪種形式,一定跟資產有關。發達國家政府從來沒有像2000年中期一樣,平衡好推動房產發展的慾望與避免房產信貸危機之間的關係。在美國,人們不願意麵對這個問題,因為納稅人承擔了所有借貸金額的70%。無論在任何地方,監管者都在鼓勵銀行貸款給房地產,而不是貸款給實體經濟。只有當政客們意識到基礎改革,比如降低房產借貸,風險共擔抵押或者永久限制貸款估值比時,風險才能降低。美國的納稅人應該擺脫為抵押債務擔保的爛攤子。悲哀的是,平民主義者很難接受房東。

  • divine /d?va?n/ 神聖的,非凡的
  • reconcile /r?k?nsa?l/ 和解,解約
  • underwrite /??nd?ra?t/ 給...保險
  • mitigate /m?t?ɡet/ 緩和,減輕
  • loan-to-value ratio 貸款與估值比

Next, the greenback. The crisis spread across borders because European banks ran out of the dollars they needed to pay back their dollar-denominated borrowing. The Fed acted as lender of last resort to the world, o?ering foreigners $1trn of liquidity. Since then, o?shore dollar debts have roughly doubled. In the next crisis, America』s political system is unlikely to let the Fed act as the backstop to this vast system, even after Donald Trump leaves the White House. Finding ways to make o?shore dollar ?nance safe, such as pooling dollar reserves among emerging-market countries, relies on international cooperation of the type that is fast falling out of fashion.

然後是美元。經濟危機能夠蔓延到其他國家,是因為歐洲多家銀行美元儲量見底,而他們還需要長海美元主導的借貸。聯邦政府執法人員扮演了避風港灣借款人的角色,像外國人提供了價值1000億美元的流動資產。自充那時起,離岸美元債務就幾乎增長了一倍。下次危機來臨時,美國政策不太可能讓聯邦政府擔當後盾,哪怕特朗普卸任也不可能。之前確保離岸美元安全的方案,比如在新興市場大量儲備美元,或者以來國際公司的形式很快就會失去作用。

  • greenback 美元
  • liquidity /l?kw?d?ti/ 資產流動性
  • backstop/b?k,stɑp/ 支撐物(棒球術語)

The rise of nationalism also hinders Europe from solving the euro』s structural problems. The crisis showed how a country』s banks and its government are intertwined: the state struggles to borrow enough to support the banks, which are dragged down by the falling value of government debt. This 「doom loop」 remains mostly intact. Until Europe shares more risks across national borders—whether through ?nancial markets, deposit guarantees or ?scal policy—the future of the single currency will remain in doubt. A chaotic collapse of the euro would make the crisis of 2008 look like a picnic.

愛國主義也阻擋了歐洲解決歐元結構性問題的步伐。危機表明國家銀行和政府的關係可以如此緊密:國家竭盡全力給銀行提供足夠貸款,而銀行卻因為政府債券貶值而深受拖累。這種「厄運循環」幾乎無解。直到歐洲將危機的風險蔓延過邊界--無論是通過財政市場,存款擔保或者財政政策--單一貨幣在未來的穩定性將存疑。一旦歐元暴跌,那麼2008年的經濟危機根本不值一提。

  • nationalism /n??n?l?z?m/ 愛國主義
  • intertwine/??nt?twa?n/ 糾纏在一起

Policymakers have made the economy safer, but they still have plenty of lessons to learn. And fracturing geopolitics make globalised ?nance even harder to deal with. A decade after Lehman failed, ?nance has a worrying amount to ?x.

決策者們讓經濟更加穩定,但他們也有很多課要補。破損的地緣政治也使得全球性財政危機更難應對。在雷曼兄弟破產十年後,財政決策者們要做的功課,還有很多。

  • fracture /fr?kt??/ 壓裂,破裂

【總結】

有些時候,如何運用手裡的經濟政策取決於受益者是誰。


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